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INTRODUCTION 
Civil society is a battleground. 
If we understand civil society to mean the whole panoply of volun-
tary associations that are neither governmental nor “market” organiza-
tions—i.e. not organizations oriented toward profit—we immediately un-
derstand how vast a field for battle it really is. It comprises parent-teacher 
associations and mosques, unions, environmental advocacy groups, evan-
gelical churches, rifle clubs, and much, much else. Alexis de Tocqueville 
noted the importance of a robust civil society for democratic governance, 
stating that Americans’ penchant for civic association developed the in-
terpersonal trust necessary for the nonviolent resolution of conflict.1 But, 
it has also become clear that a robust civil society eases the work of for-
mal governing by effecting a division of labor between governmental and 
private organizations in the matter of social welfare provision and of so-
cial integration, and does so beyond the democratic context. A robust and 
independent civil sphere reduces the costs of governance by forming a 
complex context of consent, wherein the very intersecting networks of 
group membership and participation help keep both discourses of support 
for and opposition to the state and its policies within bounds and render 
civic groups unlikely to organize as an alternative claimant to state 
power.2 
Because civil society is so diverse, it contains groups of all persua-
sions and of many, often-shifting, functions, and they often come into 
conflict. Civil society organizations, such as unions, come into conflict 
with other civil society organizations, such as chambers of commerce, 
over minimum wages, and tenant organizations come into conflict with 
landlord lobbying groups. Equally, tenant organizations sometimes be-
come nonprofit landlords, as they did in great numbers during the 1980-
90s in New York City, when the municipal government sought to dispose 
of thousands of tax-foreclosed properties it had taken from landlords who 
 
 1 See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCǪUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 895-902 (James T. Schliefer 
trans., Eduardo Nolla ed. 1835). 
 2 See ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (ElecBook London, 
Quentin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans. & eds. 1999) 236-38 (1971). See also IRA 
KATZNELSON, CITY TRENCHES: THE PATTERNING OF CLASS IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1981) 
(adapting Gramscian understandings to contemporary institutional divisions in urban politics); 
Joseph Buttigieg, The Contemporary Discourse on Civil Society: A Gramscian Critique 32 
BOUNDARY 2, at 33, 40-41 (2005) (discussing the relation of civil society and the state). 
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abandoned them.3 The government looked to tenant organizations and 
turned them into partners, paying them to be part of a solution for the 
blossoming housing crisis. Similarly, the City mobilized and consolidated 
existing volunteer efforts to care for its parks when the fiscal crisis of the 
late 1970s led to steep cuts in parks maintenance and the layoffs of hun-
dreds of parks workers.4 These efforts, especially those galvanized in the 
late 1990s, after another round of layoffs in the early 1990s, became an 
array of parks conservancies, “Friends of” various parks, and additional 
similar organizations, which the City government coordinated.5 In paral-
lel, residents of neighborhoods dotted with vacant lots in the wake of a 
building collapse transformed them into spaces that functioned as parks 
without municipal support or, frequently, without permission. Decades 
later, as a result of protest and litigation, the City government finally rec-
ognized that these open spaces, created by residents and stewarded inde-
pendently of the City, were as valuable to New Yorkers as the parks that 
the City itself had created (and abandoned).6 
This paper considers efforts to steward urban land in the distinct 
forms of affordable housing and public parks in the shared context of their 
growth in New York City from the 1980s until today. 
The stewardship efforts for affordable housing take the form of com-
munity land trusts (CLTs), which are nonprofit organizations that own 
and lease land. In so doing, CLTs use the lease mechanism to enforce 
restrictions on the use and affordability of housing.7 Boards of directors, 
made up of individuals selected to represent different community constit-
uencies, run CLTs. 
 
 3 See COREY ROSSI, UNIV. AT BUFFALO LAW SCH., MARKETING CITY-OWNED PROPERTIES 
12-14 (2008), https://perma.cc/MB47-F2RP; see also generally DOUG TURETSKY & 
MARGARET MITTLEBACH, WE ARE THE LANDLORDS, NOW: A REPORT ON COMMUNITY-BASED 
HOUSING MANAGEMENT (1993); Desirée Fields, Contesting the Financialization of Urban 
Space: Community-Based Organizations and the Struggle to Preserve Affordable Rental 
Housing in New York City 37 J. URB. AFF. 144 (2015); Laura Wolf-Powers, New York City’s 
Community Housing Movement: Achievements and Prospects, in COMMUNITY ACTION AND 
PLANNING: CONTEXTS, DRIVERS AND OUTCOMES (Nick Gallent & Daniela Ciaffi eds., 2014). 
 4 JOHN KRINSKY & MAUD SIMONET, WHO CLEANS THE PARK? PUBLIC WORK AND URBAN 
GOVERNANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 5, 52, 156-61 (2017); see generally KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, FEAR 
CITY: NEW YORK’S FISCAL CRISIS AND THE RISE OF AUSTERITY POLITICS 4-7 (2017) (providing 
a detailed account of New York City’s fiscal crisis and how austerity politics continue to im-
pact New York today). 
 5 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at ch. 5. 
 6 See, e.g., Camille Bautista, 34 Community Gardens Saved from Demolition After City 
Makes Them Parks, DNA INFO, https://perma.cc/U64V-C93V (last updated Jan. 3, 2016, 9:10 
AM). 
 7 John Emmeus Davis, Common Ground: Community-Led Development on Community-
Owned Land, ROOTS & BRANCHES (June 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/G7Q4-CQ46. 
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Stewardship efforts for parks take the forms of, on the one hand, con-
servancies and “Friends of” groups—which are self-perpetuating non-
profit organizations that coordinate volunteer efforts in parks and some-
times contract with the City to provide staff and capital improvements—
and, on the other, unincorporated associations self-anointed as creators of 
new park spaces.8 
Organizations engaged in the stewardship of land for housing and of 
land as open space in the City can be understood—and sometimes under-
stand themselves—in the context of “the commons” and its governance. 
Each organization struggles with its own dilemmas with respect to their 
role in governing the commons, dilemmas typical of other groups that 
have been the subject of commons scholarship. But there are contrasts 
between their approaches to these dilemmas that suggest that a variety 
within and between each form of commons is consequential from a polit-
ical and a policy standpoint. In addition, these contrasts illustrate that not 
all “commoning” is alike, in part because the relationship of the organi-
zations to place-based capital—in this case, urban land—diverges in crit-
ical, and even opposed, ways.9 
This article examines the mechanisms for commoning the city itself. 
It begins with a brief introduction to an understanding of the commons 
and of commoning, following the lead of Elinor Ostrom’s “design princi-
ples” for governing common pool resources (CPRs). The article then dis-
cusses the ways in which urban land can be understood as a CPR but lo-
cates the discussion of commons governance more clearly in a critical 
reading of the recent history of neoliberal governance. An introduction to 
CLTs and parks conservancies in some more historical detail follows, pre-
senting their governance strategies against the background of Ostrom’s 
principles, and discussing their typical governance dilemmas and results. 
Lastly, the article discusses ways in which both CLTs and conservancies 
diverge from others of their same class (some conservancies from others; 
some CLTs from others), largely based upon their respective effects on 
urban land values, and hence, on the ability of each of the organizations 
to steward resources for the commons and in common.  
 
 8 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 156-60. 
 9 See generally JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 147-99 (1987) (arguing that the interests of place-based capi-
tal, which is capital dependent on the intensified use of urban land for profit, create sometimes 
strange-bedfellow coalitions that dominate urban decision-making). Conservancies and CLTs 
differ in that CLTs explicitly seek to remove land from capital circulation. 
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Throughout, John Krinsky and Maud Simonet’s Who Cleans the 
Park?10 will be used for a discussion of conservancies; the authors’ on-
going research and participation in community land trust (CLT) activism 
in New York City forms the foundation for the discussion of CLTs. 
I. GOVERNING THE (NEOLIBERAL) COMMONS 
The “commons” is best understood as a set of collective practices 
that support collective rights.11 Elinor Ostrom further specifies that the 
commons applies to the management of common pool resources 
(CPRs).12 A common pool resource is a “natural or man-made resource 
system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) 
to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use.”13 
Commons stewardship mediates the clash between private and public in-
terests: there is a public interest in the continued availability of the re-
source, but a private interest in appropriating and using the resource to the 
exclusion of others. In this way, CPRs are both similar and different from 
public goods, such as clean air, which is available to all, but not divisible 
into appropriable and depletable portions. Hence, while there are free-
rider problems in preserving CPRs, in the same way as there are with 
public goods, the possibility of preserving some private appropriation 
while helping to renew, preserve, and expand the resources remains a key 
theme in efforts at “commoning.”14 Commons are less about the right to 
the use of a resource, and more about the right to participation in how a 
resource is preserved and expanded.15 Commoning is thus an inherently 
expansionist and future-oriented project. 
David Harvey describes the process of creating shared value in com-
moning: 
There is, in effect, a social practice of commoning. This practice 
produces or establishes a social relation with a common whose 
 
 10 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, passim. 
 11 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 20, 27 (Dec. 10, 
1948) (“Everyone has the right freedom of peaceful assembly and association . . . . Everyone 
has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community . . . .”); see also Michael 
Freeman, Are There Collective Human Rights?, 43 POL. STUD. 25, 28-29, 32-35 (1995). 
 12 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (detailing more information on the cost of collective action to 
preserve individual interests in public goods). 
 15 See DAVID HARVEY, REBEL CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN 
REVOLUTION 72-73 (2012) [hereinafter HARVEY, REBEL CITIES]. 
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uses are either exclusive to a social group or partially or fully open 
to all and sundry. At the heart of the practice of commoning lies 
the principle that the relation between the social group and that 
aspect of the environment being treated as a common shall be both 
collective and non-commodified—off-limits to the logic of mar-
ket exchange and market valuations.16 
When applied to real property in the urban context, this appears “ab-
surdly optimistic” because the market captures the value created by new 
amenities, such as more stable neighborhoods, lower crime, cleaner parks, 
commercial activity, and “people living in proximity and creating art and 
culture”: the market translates all of that into “land value.”17 Capturing 
that value interrupts the function of a city as a commons.18 “As long as 
land can be bought, the enclosure of the common wealth created by people 
in proximity of that land is a certainty.”19 Even when the land is a private 
house purchased by a single buyer, “its market value is the sum total of 
its context; that value (with) draws from the collaborative and parallel 
efforts of people other than the buyer, seller, and [even] public entities 
and the infrastructure that they provide.20  
It may seem like a truism of the real estate industry that collective 
assets near a marketable “private” property make that property 
worth more to prospective buyers. But, that calculation of worth 
is itself an enclosure: [the] privatization of shared labor that 
threatens to displace the very individuals whose labor resulted in 
the creation of the asset that drives prices up. 21  
 
 16 Id. at 73. 
 17 Amy Laura Cahn & Paula Z. Segal, You Can’t Common What You Can’t See: Towards 
a Restorative Polycentrism in the Governance of Our Cities, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 230 
(2016). 
 18 See generally Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV 281, 313 (2016) (arguing that real estate markets cannot be relied upon “to assem-
ble urban participants optimally or to maximize the positive agglomeration benefits of urban 
common space”). 
 19 Cahn & Segal, supra note 17, at 230 (citing Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common 
Right and the Property of the Poor, 17 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 311 (2008)) (discussing how the 
dynamics of inner-city gentrification constitute an enclosure of urban poor commons). 
 20 Id. at 230-31; see Sheila R. Foster, The City as an Ecological Space: Social Capital 
and Urban Land Use, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 529 (2013) (“Legal scholars have yet to 
fully grapple with the costs imposed on the social networks and ties, or social fabric of a 
community, arising from land use and development decisions.”). 
 21 Cahn & Segal, supra note 17, at 231. Cf. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT 
AMERICAN CITIES 146-83 (Vintage Books ed., 1992). 
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This is exactly “what David Harvey terms, ‘accumulation by disposses-
sion,’”22 and “what John Davis describes as ‘immoral’: the private capture 
of community-generated value and its transformation into individual 
‘wealth.’”23 
There is optimism in the reality that institutions have arisen that chal-
lenge and distort this market logic by their stewardship of land outside 
this system of immoral dispossession. Yet, how well they succeed is a 
question of how much they actually manage to transform urban land into 
a commons. 
Understanding housing as a traditional CPR is fairly straightforward: 
given our conventions of domesticity, after a certain point, when someone 
lives on a parcel of land, another person cannot. Thus, not only is the 
availability of the resource depleted, but once appropriated, there is no 
common right to occupy a given parcel. 
The issue of urban land as a common pool resource is less clear when 
one thinks about parks. Instead, parks seem to be more of a public good—
indivisible and non-exclusive. But, there are uses of the parks—including 
in their administration—that either result in the generation of excludable 
goods or are excludable and private goods in themselves. 
In New York State, where the inquiry here is focused, the public trust 
doctrine protects the public’s recreational enjoyment of land that has been 
set aside as parkland.24 Courts affirm that once land has been dedicated 
to use as a park, it cannot be diverted for uses other than recreation, in 
whole or in part, temporarily or permanently, even for another public pur-
pose, without legislative approval.25 In order to convey parkland to a non-
public entity, or to use parkland for another purpose, even temporarily, “a 
municipality must receive [prior] authorization from the State” in the 
 
 22 Cahn & Segal, supra note 17, at 231 (citing DAVID HARVEY, Capital Bondage, in THE 
NEW IMPERIALISM 87-136 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2003)). 
 23 Id. (quoting Davis, supra note 8). 
 24 The law recognizes that some lands deserve protection because the government explic-
itly dedicates them for use as a park, and some lands gain protection because the totality of 
government action is sufficient to induce the public’s reliance on the open space, even without 
a formal dedication. See Appellants’ Brief at 25-27, State v. City of New York, Nos. 200-
02038, 2000-02678, 2000 WL 34551035 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 29, 2000) (filed to protect 
community gardens from being auctioned by the City). The standard for implied dedication 
was reiterated by the New York Court of Appeals in Glick v. Harvey, 25 N.Y.3d 1175, 1180 
(2015) (“A party seeking to establish such an implied dedication and thereby successfully 
challenge the alienation of the land must show that (1) ‘[t]he acts and declarations of the land 
owner indicating the intent to dedicate his land to the public use [are] unmistakable in their 
purpose and decisive in their character to have the effect of a dedication’ and (2) that the public 
has accepted the land as dedicated to a public use.”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 25 United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing 
Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253 (1920)). 
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form of legislation enacted by the New York State Legislature and the 
Governor.26 Local government holds municipal parkland in trust for the 
public; the State Legislature must approve its sale or conveyance, as the 
representative of the people.27 This rule is based on “the importance of 
parks to a community’s health and the happiness of its citizens.”28 This 
has been the law in New York since at least 1871.29 
Krinsky and Simonet urge an understanding of parks not just as 
places of leisure, but also as sites of both direct and indirect accumulation 
and as worksites.30 Here, they draw attention to the ways in which New 
York City’s municipal government has degraded the labor contracts of 
city workers, on one hand—staffing the department increasingly with 
“workfare,” “trainees,” and people sentenced to community service, as 
well as relying increasingly on individual, civic-group-organized, and 
corporate volunteers—and privatized the management of many parks 
through nonprofit conservancies on the other.31 Thus, within the context 
of the regulated non-exclusive use of parks as places of leisure, there are 
 
 26 N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES., HANDBOOK ON THE 
ALIENATION AND CONVERSION OF MUNICIPAL PARKLAND 3 (2017) [hereinafter ALIENATION 
HANDBOOK], https://perma.cc/DT3D-DZDJ; Thomas Honan, Comment, These Parks Are Our 
Parks: An Examination of the Privatization of Public Parks in New York City and the Public 
Trust Doctrine’s Protections, 18 CUNY L. REV. 107, 123-24 (2015). 
 27 ALIENATION HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 3, n.4 (citing People v. New York & Staten 
Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 78 (1877)) (“The State, in place of the crown, holds the title, as 
trustee of a public trust, but the legislature may, as the representative of the people, grant the 
soil, or confer an exclusive privilege in tide-waters, or authorize a use inconsistent with the 
public right, subject to the paramount control of congress, through laws passed, in pursuance 
of the power to regulate commerce, given in the federal Constitution.”); see also Brooklyn 
Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 243 (1871) (“It was within the power of the legis-
lature to relieve the city from the trust to hold it for a use only, and to authorize it to sell and 
convey.”). 
 28 ALIENATION HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 3 (citing Williams, 229 N.Y. at 254) (“[Park-
lands] facilitate free public means of pleasure, recreation and amusement and thus provide for 
the welfare of the community.”); see also Aldrich v. City of New York, 208 Misc. 930, 940 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1955) (“Parks play a vital role in the health of a community, which 
‘has more to do with the general prosperity and welfare of a State than its wealth or its learning 
or its culture.’”). 
 29 ALIENATION HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 3. Simultaneously to the development of 
this legal doctrine, Central Park was developed in the years between 1857 and 1873. Site se-
lection, design and construction were managed by the State of New York (not the City). In-
creases in property tax revenue to the City were one of the incentives that the State presented 
to NYC residents as flowing from the project. 
 30 See KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 219-30 (contrasting direct accumulation as 
getting value out of the labor process, which in the public sector, usually means paying work-
ers less, while indirect accumulation means deriving value from trade in the products whose 
value the workers enhance, such as land values and concessions). 
 31 Id. at 20-25, ch. 2. 
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divisible goods—mostly bad jobs, but occasional access to good ones—
on the labor side. On the conservancy side, there is contest over City con-
tracts and their terms, especially over the amount of money that conserv-
ancies can retain for their own operation from food and other concessions 
located in the parks that they manage. For the concessionaires, moreover, 
parks are sites for employment and for sales. When parks give conces-
sions to more expensive vendors—by replacing a hot dog stand with an 
artisanal barbecue vendor, for example—it puts the full experience of the 
park out of reach for anyone unable to afford the new concession.32 
Crucially, for people owning property in close proximity to parks 
that are well cared for, there is a significant premium on their real-estate 
value that they get to appropriate privately and nearly in its entirety.33 
Ironically, even as it gives explicit protection to a process of commoning, 
the public trust doctrine can also be viewed as a mechanism to protect the 
pecuniary interests of property owners who purchase marketable property 
near parks.34 By preventing the private appropriation of parkland for non-
park uses, it protects the park-enhanced market value—or “exchange 
value,” in Marx’s terms—of neighboring properties. 
The labor-cost saving imperative of conservancies, combined with 
issues concerning a park’s retention of concession revenues, can lead to 
several situations in which parks take on the character of CPRs. For ex-
ample, it is an increasingly common practice to preserve the appearance 
 
 32 See id. at 164-66. 
 33 In community gardens, the Parks Department abdicates all responsibility for care, shift-
ing it to residents who have survived decades of disinvestment in every kind of local infra-
structure. It may seem that the Department is only lured back by evidence that well-appointed 
gardens increase property values, see Ioan Voicu & Vicki Been, The Effect of Community 
Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 36 REAL EST. ECON. 241, 268 (2008), as opposed 
to the evidence that they improve quality of life. Similarly, as KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra 
note 4, at 221-30, find, recent justifications for the care of parks focus on their role as economic 
engines. See also APPLESEED, INC., THE CENTRAL PARK EFFECT: ASSESSING THE VALUE OF 
CENTRAL PARK’S CONTRIBUTION TO NEW YORK CITY’S ECONOMY 35-43 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/8HN5-LQNM. Even in the 1850s, the State touted the potential bump to prop-
erty taxes as a reason that New Yorkers should embrace Central Park; some then did not be-
lieve it, opposing the seizure of occupied private land by eminent domain because its dedica-
tion as parkland would permanently remove it from the tax rolls. Those New Yorkers were 
right to concern themselves with the communities, like Seneca Village, that lost their place so 
that the whole City could have a park. But they were mistaken to worry about the fiscal health 
of the City as a whole—what the creation of the park took away in terms of individual property 
tax accounts it gave back by increasing what was due on neighboring properties. 
 34 See, e.g., THE TRUST FOR PUB. LAND, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PARKS, TRAILS, AND 
CONSERVED OPEN SPACES IN BEAUFORT COUNTY, SOUTH CAROLINA 2 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/4TDT-JERB (“Parks, trails, and conserved open spaces increase[d] the value 
of nearby residential properties in Beaufort County because people enjoy these amenities and 
are willing to pay for this proximity.”). 
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and health of lawns in parks by fencing them off from the public for sig-
nificant periods of time.35 One can imagine that the pristine appearance 
of parks accrues to land values around it, even when this is linked to the 
public’s inability to access significant areas of the park itself. Similarly, 
controversy has recently arisen around whether ticketed events, such as 
concerts and galas—themselves a kind of concession—amount to “alien-
ation” of public access;36 this has even extended to non-ticketed events 
such as weddings—for which the wedding party pays—and to free, but 
closed events, such as barbecues for community-garden members, in gar-
dens that are administered under the Parks Department’s Green Thumb 
program.37 
None of this, of course, means that parks are technically a CPR all 
the time, but in their everyday hybridity—and certainly for land that is not 
yet but could be parkland—there are similar problems of governance that 
civil society organizations face. In an idealized world, the totality of urban 
land itself would be a CPR and everyone—or, at least, the members of the 
 
 35 See Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. City of New York, 42 Misc. 3d 1208(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Kings Cty. 2013). Filed in 2006, this long-running litigation involves a 20-acre composting 
facility operated by the City Department of Sanitation in Spring Creek Park in Old Mill Creek, 
Brooklyn. The facility was intended to process leaves and other organic waste collected from 
around the City for use as fertilizer in Spring Creek Park and other parks. Petitioners alleged 
that the placement and operation of the composting facility within Spring Creek Park without 
State approval violated the public trust doctrine, on the basis that a solid waste management 
facility could not be considered an appropriate park use and that the public was deprived of 
recreational access to the area of the facility. The City argued that the composting facility fell 
within the meaning of a legitimate “park use” under the public trust doctrine because the com-
post would be used in park maintenance. Interpreting the term “park use,” the Court focused 
on whether the use was consistent with the public’s recreational enjoyment of the park and 
held that the composting facility was not. Other examples of uses that require alienation by 
the State Legislature include museums, roads, public works facilities and storage space, park-
ing for municipal vehicles, and housing. ALIENATION HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 6-7. Uses 
incidental to parks are not considered alienation; these include public libraries, monuments, 
zoos, playgrounds, rest houses, parking lots for park patrons, restaurants and snack bars, bike 
share stations and recreational facilities (e.g., batting cages, golf courses, skating rinks, boat 
launches and marinas, and the associated equipment concessions). Id. at 7, 7 n.34 (citations 
omitted). Is the cordoning off of grass really incidental to park use? Or is it more akin to 
storage space? No court has yet considered this question. 
 36 See SFX Entm’t, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 124059/01, 2002 WL 1363372, at *8-
10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2002) (finding a violation of public trust doctrine and City con-
cession regulations where an amphitheater hosting events with average $30 ticket price was 
to be built on parkland on Randall’s Island and confirming that it did not serve a park purpose 
because not all members of the public could afford it), rev’d 297 A.D.2d 555, 555 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2002); see also Honan, supra note 27, at 107-09 (discussing ticketed events and ameni-
ties). 
 37 Phone Interviews with Gardeners and Staff Members of NYC Parks Department (Aug. 
10-12, 2018). 
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common governance body—would have a say in its allocation and its po-
tential for expansion and renewal. Sectarianism and the inheritance of a 
neoliberal body politic has kept this ideal world from becoming our entire 
reality by 2019, but the seeds are planted. To some degree, this is a justi-
fication for urban land-use regulations and zoning: there is a common in-
terest that must be safeguarded that supersedes the private interests of ap-
propriation.38 
In the background to all of this over much of the last half century is 
massive disinvestment of private capital from urban space coupled with 
disinvestment by the state in its social infrastructure and its selectively 
making urban space available for targeted reinvestment. What this has 
amounted to is akin to an “enclosure” of the commons, ensnaring both 
common pool resources and public goods under what is still best de-
scribed as “actually existing neoliberalism.”39 Here, “neoliberalism” is 
not simply a stand-in for a fully realized program of for-profit marketiza-
tion, but rather a variegated strategy to refashion institutions of labor, cap-
ital, and the state, as well as their relationships with each other. As Marx-
ist scholars of the state have repeated, states grapple with the problem of 
needing to support capital accumulation on one hand, and the need for 
popular legitimacy on the other.40 In the context of a post-1970s world 
with rapidly increasing inequality and increased frequency of bubble-
driven crises that lead to mass economic displacement, the turn to non-
profit civil-society organizations as a critical adjunct to urban governance 
has been a strongly legitimizing move. It has provided some real benefits 
to the dispossessed, and, even while significantly empowering organized 
philanthropy,41 has also created new terrains of contest over urban 
 
 38 Additionally, there is a tension between uses: if a given parcel is to be assigned a use 
as publicly accessible open space, it cannot simultaneously be used for housing, and vice 
versa. Yet, it is indisputable that cities need both. 
 39 See generally Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Cities and the Geographies of “Actually 
Existing Neoliberalism,” 34 ANTIPODE 349 (2002) (discussing “a critical geographical per-
spective on neoliberalism that emphasizes (a) the path-dependent character of neoliberal re-
form projects and (b) the strategic role of cities in the contemporary remaking of political-
economic space.”). 
 40 See, e.g., JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE 6-10 (Routledge ed. 
2017) (1973). 
 41 See generally DAVID CALLAHAN, THE GIVERS: WEALTH, POWER, AND PHILANTHROPY 
IN A NEW GILDED AGE (2018) (describing how major donors’ charitable giving overlaps with 
their political aims). 
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power.42 These contests, in turn, often focus on the extent of commodifi-
cation, on the right to common pool and public goods, and on the exclu-
sion of entire groups of people and the neighborhoods they live in from 
the benefits appropriated by others.43 
Ostrom proposes eight “design principles” for the governance of 
CPRs.44 They are as follows: 
(1) CPRs are clearly defined and users with the right to appropri-
ate CPR units are clearly defined; 
(2) Rules of appropriation of CPR units are defined according to 
the ability to replenish the common pool; 
(3) People with a right to withdraw from the pool have a say over 
the governance arrangements and their modification; 
(4) Collectively accountable monitoring of the system; 
(5) System of escalating sanctions for violating the rules that get 
more severe with each violation or with the seriousness of the vi-
olation; 
(6) Easy-to-access conflict resolution mechanisms; 
(7) Users have a “minimal right to organize” a body to govern the 
CPR without interference from a government entity; and 
(8) For more complex systems of common pool resources, these 
functions exist throughout a nested set of organizations. 
As we will see in the next section, individual CLTs and conservan-
cies differ in the extent to which they fulfill these governing tasks. And 
for land that goes to housing as opposed to land that goes to parks, the 
clarity of categories of users, of rules, of the prospect of resources to re-
new the pool, and of accountability and dispute mechanisms diverge con-
siderably. Moreover, the support for conservancies by the City—and its 
almost intrusive encouragement of “independent initiative”—contrasts 
with its much more suspicious and less facilitative stance toward CLTs. 
Choices that activists in each group face, however, center around ques-
tions of public or governmental support and of whether the goods that 
they steward are, in their estimation, best protected through processes of 
decommodification or through processes that deepen commodification. 
 
 42 See, e.g., Alan S. Oser, Perspectives: The Cooper Square Plan; Smoothing the Path to 
Redevelopment, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 1991), https://perma.cc/8DT7-58BQ (stating that the 
city agreed to rehabilitate 430 units that were once taken for urban-renewal development). 
 43 See Cahn & Segal, supra note 17, at 199-200. 
 44 OSTROM, supra note 12, at 90. 
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II. MANIFESTATIONS OF COMMONING 
A. Community Land Trusts 
Community Land Trusts (CLTs) are a form of nonprofit organization 
that owns land and leases it for housing and other uses as a way to keep 
the property from foreclosure.45 A CLT is more than a deed and a ground 
lease, however: it is an organization designed to steward property.46 Typ-
ical CLT ground leases are renewable 99-year leases that contain signifi-
cant restrictions on resale and use of the buildings on the land it owns.47 
Based originally on the economics of Henry George, who identified pri-
vate land ownership and speculation as the key source of exploitation,48 
CLTs have roots in Civil Rights-era struggles over land access in the rural 
South and in urban areas throughout the United States, Britain, and sev-
eral countries in Europe as a way to “common” land and housing for com-
munity use.49 
CLTs are typically governed by a “tripartite” board, with represent-
atives of three groups with interests at stake: (1) residents and leasehold-
ers of the housing on CLT land, whose interest is in the ongoing steward-
ship of the CLT’s resources; (2) community residents, whose interest is 
in the CLT’s expansion to control more property in the area; and (3) other 
“outside” directors whose expertise is in housing and other skills of pos-
sible use to the CLT board, and whose interest is in the ongoing function-
ing of the CLT.50 Some CLTs have elected boards, others have self-per-
petuating appointed ones, but most still follow some general version of 
this model.51 
However they are set up, CLTs largely fulfill the demands of most 
of Ostrom’s “design principles.” The basic tripartite governance structure 
is itself based on a definition of boundaries among classes of interested 
 
 45 Davis, supra note 8, at 2. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 2 n.5. 
 48 See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE 
OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF WEALTH, THE 
REMEDY bks. III-X (50th ed. 1935). 
 49 See generally GROUNDED SOLUTIONS NETWORK, http://cltnetwork.org/ (last visited July 
26, 2019). See JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, THE COMMUNITY LAND 
TRUST READER 6-7 (2010); EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TO-MORROW 76-84 (2d 
ed. 1902); DENNIS HARDY, UTOPIAN ENGLAND: COMMUNITY EXPERIMENTS 1900-1945, at 85-
97 (2000). See also JOHN KRINSKY & SARAH HOVDE, BALANCING ACTS: THE EXPERIENCES OF 
MUTUAL HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS AND COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS IN URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 
19-22 (1996), https://perma.cc/B24S-UAGU. 
 50 Davis, supra note 7, at 2 n.4. 
 51 Id. at 3. 
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parties—e.g. residents, leaseholders, the larger community—and builds 
in a kind of arbiter within a third category. CLT boards that are unelected 
are nearly always drawn from a larger neighborhood organization whose 
directors are elected or include nested organizations (as in design princi-
ple 8) that have elected governance, as with housing cooperatives and 
mutual housing associations.52 The idea is to maintain democratic control 
over the land resource and to balance that control with mechanisms that 
would prevent opening the CPR to exploitation by outsiders like private 
developers or their agents, and that therefore would preserve the govern-
ance arrangements over the long term. 
There are more than two hundred CLTs across the United States,53 
but most individual CLTs have fewer than fifty housing units under their 
control.54 Many are rural, and even those that are urban often focus on 
leasing land to owners of single-family houses.55 In New York City, two 
CLTs were formed in the 1980s and 1990s with a mission of keeping 
housing affordable: Cooper Square and Rehabilitation in Action to Im-
prove Neighborhoods (“RAIN”) CLTs, both based in New York’s tradi-
tionally working-class but now gentrified Lower East Side neighbor-
hood.56 They have been doing so at different scales for decades.57 Four 
CLTs formed to steward community gardens in the early 2000s.58 
 
 52 Id. at 2-4. 
 53 See MICHAEL ZONTA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS: A 
PROMISING TOOL FOR EXPANDING AND PRESERVING AFFORDABLE HOUSING 5 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/V7CD-8CPB. 
 54 TOM ANGOTTI, COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS AND LOW-INCOME MULTIFAMILY RENTAL 
HOUSING: THE CASE OF COOPER SQUARE, NEW YORK CITY 9 (2007), https://perma.cc/9YMR-
Q8JQ. 
 55 Id. at 1. 
 56 ANGOTTI, supra note 54, at 5-7 (Cooper Square CLT); KRINSKY & HOVDE, supra note 
49, at B-6, B-15 (1996) (Cooper Square and RAIN). Oksana Mironova, The Value of Land: 
How Community Land Trusts Maintain Housing Affordability, URB. OMNIBUS (Apr. 29, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/R5BG-3RZ4 (discussing Rehabilitation in Action to Improve Neighborhoods 
(“RAIN”) CLT, which was also formed via residential efforts and organizers in the 1970s and 
1980s). 
 57 See, e.g., KRINSKY & HOVDE, supra note 49, at B-6, B-15. 
 58 See Elissa Sampson, A Flowering of Resistance: The Gardens of the East Village, 
SIXTH STREET CENTER (Aug. 12, 2009), https://perma.cc/KH8P-5NG2 (describing how the 
Manhattan Land Trust came to own gardens); About Us, BROOKLYN QUEENS LAND TRUST, 
https://perma.cc/9L2P-Z5V2 (last visited July 26, 2019) (describing the history of the Brook-
lyn Queens Land Trust); Five Local Gardens Working Together Towards The Same Green 
Mission = B.A.N.G., WARREN ST. MARKS COMMUNITY GARDEN, https://perma.cc/K8D8-BSS7 
(last visited July 26, 2019) (describing the Brooklyn Alliance of Neighborhood Gardens 
(“BANG”) land trust); NYC Community Gardens Turned Over to Local Land Trusts, THE TR. 
FOR PUB. LAND (June 28, 2011), https://perma.cc/LHQ2-84G2 (describing the history of Man-
hattan Land Trust and Bronx Land Trust). In addition, the El Sol Brilliante garden is owned 
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Today, the larger, more active, and more expansionist housing CLT, 
the Cooper Square CLT, owns the land under twenty-three buildings with 
over 600 apartments organized into a scatter-site mutual housing associ-
ation (MHA) and cooperative, and is in the process of acquiring two more 
buildings.59 The Cooper Square Committee is the Cooper Square CLT’s 
and MHA’s parent organization; the Committee was organized in 1959 to 
fight Robert Moses’ urban renewal plans for the neighborhood. Coopera-
tive residents elect the MHA board. The CLT board members appoint 
themselves and their replacements: one-third of the members of the CLT 
board are selected by the MHA and must be shareholders in the coopera-
tive; the others are chosen via a traditional board search to represent the 
interests of the local community. 
CLTs and MHAs gained some early traction in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, as tenant cooperatives that had been formed by people in-
habiting vacant tax-foreclosed housing ran into physical repair and gov-
ernance problems, and as many of the tenant groups-turned-community-
development-corporations began to realize that they had become the tar-
geted “agency” or “landlord” to tenants for whom they used to fight.60 
Some community development corporations and cooperatives had never 
invested in the development of democratic accountability and stewardship 
mechanisms that might have fulfilled Ostrom’s fourth, fifth, and sixth 
principles. Further, low-balled repair budgets in the initial development 
and handover from City ownership (design principle 2) meant that cash-
strapped housing groups began to look for organizational forms that could 
provide economies of scale, democratic accountability mechanisms, and 
the corrective functions of stewardship. Yet, by the end of 1993, with the 
election of Rudolph Giuliani as mayor, and over the next twenty years as 
his two terms were followed by Michael Bloomberg’s subsequent three 
terms, planned MHAs and CLTs were put on hold and generally withered 
on the vine.61 The City reoriented its redevelopment by stopping the re-
habilitation of the housing supply by ceasing tax foreclosures entirely and 
 
by a non-profit incorporated under the New York State Housing Development Fund Corpora-
tion law, which permits community management and stewardship. See El Sol Brilliante, 
LIVING LOTS NYC, https://perma.cc/AF8W-AYW2 (last visited July 26, 2019). 
 59 Press Release, NYC Hous. Pres. & Dev., Enterprise Awards New York City $1.65 Mil-
lion to Support the Formation and Expansion of Community Land Trusts (July 19, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/8TW4-ZAXV. 
 60 See Krinsky & Hovde, supra note 49, at 6-7 (detailing the history of CLTs and MHAs 
nationally and in New York City). 
 61 Although some of the ongoing Mutual Housing Associations and Community Land 
Trusts inventoried by Krinsky and Hovde in 1996 continued to develop housing, no new ef-
forts in New York City were undertaken for twenty years, and several groups folded, after a 
flurry of organizational foundings in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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by overwhelmingly selecting for-profit developers of affordable housing, 
even when non-profit ones were willing and able to do the work.62 
In 2012, partially in anticipation of a promised new opening in hous-
ing policy, a coalition formed among homeless activists, economic justice 
advocates, housing developers and advocates for resident-controlled, af-
fordable housing.63 The New York City Community Land Initiative 
(NYCCLI)64 coalition now has more than two dozen member groups.65 
Despite rhetoric that suggested that a new mayor in 2014 would bring 
support for a commoning of New York City, Bill de Blasio’s mayoral 
administration has been, at best, lukewarm to NYCCLI’s advocacy for 
CLTs, particularly for CLTs that develop and preserve housing for people 
who are poorer than those generally served by the City’s “affordable” 
housing programs and most at risk from gentrification and the City’s re-
zoning plans. Yet, in response to a funding opportunity created out of set-
tlement dollars from a subprime lending lawsuit brought by the State At-
torney General’s office against a major banking institution, the City 
applied to be part of a short-term arrangement to support the development 
of CLTs.66 It funded the seminar series for nine CLTs-in-formation, 
Cooper Square CLT’s operations, and property acquisitions by two addi-
tional CLTs (one formed as a pilot project for NYCCLI in the East Harlem 
neighborhood, closely modeled on Cooper Square, and Interboro CLT, 
formed by several members of NYCCLI and allied groups to focus on 
using existing City programs to develop cooperatives and homeownership 
for moderate-income residents on a CLT spread across the city).67 
In June 2019, the City of New York dedicated its first ever funding 
for groups organizing to create and sustain CLTs.68 
 
 62 See STEPHANIE SOSA, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & HOUS. DEV., THE FOR-
PROFITIZATION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AND THE DE BLASIO PLAN 1 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/4KJ3-CMDJ. 
 63 See Hillary Caldwell et al., Learning a New Politics of Land and Housing in New York 
City, ACME: INT’L J. FOR CRITICAL GEO. (forthcoming); Abigail Savitch-Lew, The NYC Com-
munity Land Trust Movement Wants to Go Big, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/C6NA-9WME. 
 64 Pronounced “nicely.” 
 65 Savitch-Lew, supra note 63. 
 66 See Oscar Perry Abello, Momentum for NYC Community Land Trusts Gets $1.65 Mil-
lion Boost, NEXT CITY (July 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/TJ9M-UJVN; see also Emma Whit-
ford, City Just Made Its Biggest Commitment Ever to a Radical Affordable Housing Model, 
GOTHAMIST (Aug. 4, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://perma.cc/26LW-XLHA. 
 67 Abello, supra note 66. 
 68 Caroline Spivack, Community Land Trusts Score Crucial Funds in City Budget, 
CURBED N.Y. (June 18, 2019, 8:50AM), https://perma.cc/25ZJ-VHNG. 
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Among the CLTs that took part in the seminar series, and others in 
their infancy now,69 there is a wide range of goals for their commoning 
efforts, from preservation and development of deeply affordable housing, 
to job-creation, gaining space for arts and health programming to envi-
ronmental stewardship. Many do not yet have boards in place or formal 
legal status that would allow them to become owners of real property.70 
The different impeti for these discrete efforts range from being a grass-
roots response to the destabilizing effects of capital influx into a specific 
neighborhood to a strategic decision by an existing organization with a 
housing development history to incorporate a CLT into its project portfo-
lio. None, save Cooper Square, have control over land and housing at the 
time of this writing.71 
B. Parks Conservancies 
If CLTs are in their relative toddlerhood in New York City, conserv-
ancies are at least in late adolescence. The fiscal crisis of the 1970s was a 
turning point for NYC parks, just as it was for housing. In its aftermath, 
the City began to experiment with new ways of adhering to the austerity 
mantra of “doing more with less.” But it was equally true that the loss of 
city workers during the crisis revealed how parlous a condition the parks 
had fallen into. And the fact was that, after Robert Moses was replaced as 
parks commissioner by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, Jr. in 1960, the depart-
ment’s management systems became unmoored.72 
Mayor Edward I. Koch’s parks commissioner, Gordon Davis, recon-
solidated a system of managers that had become autonomous in each of 
New York’s five boroughs and introduced several other management in-
novations.73 Among them was to draw on a report done in 1976 by E.S. 
Savas, a proponent of privatization, and funded by the Central Park Com-
munity Fund, founded by liberal financier George Soros and conservative 
 
 69 NYCCLI is also in contact with several that do not; one of the authors is also counsel 
to several seminar series member CLTs and several others that are emerging from grassroots 
efforts not recognized by HPD; the other author is on the curriculum development team for 
the series. 
 70 Authors are involved in these efforts as counsel and advisors. 
 71 Interboro CLT and the East Harlem El Barrio CLT are approaching property acquisi-
tion. Abigail Savitch-Lew, City Limits: City Dips Toe into Funding Community Land Trusts, 
NEW ECON. PROJECT (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/2DL6-ATXN. 
 72 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 136-39 (discussing two main park conservancy 
administrators’ recounting of the context into which they were hired). The centralized system 
for administering parks, which Moses put in place, did not work without a strong leader in the 
center. For twenty years, management suffered system-wide under Moses’ successors. 
 73 See id. at 138-39; see also CENT. PARK CONSERVANCY, CENTRAL PARK: A RESEARCH 
GUIDE 15, 28 (2016), https://perma.cc/6P2G-GCT8. 
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investor and lawyer Richard Gilder.74 Savas’ report suggested that a phil-
anthropic body be founded to steward Central Park, which would consol-
idate and expand volunteer and philanthropic efforts already directed to 
the park, and be run by a “Board of Guardians.”75 Davis shed the preten-
tious language but tapped an urban planner and biographer of Frederick 
Law Olmsted, Elizabeth Barlow (later Elizabeth Barlow Rogers), to be-
come the “Administrator” of Central Park, who founded the Central Park 
Conservancy, selected its Board of Directors and systematized restoration 
operations in the park.76 The Central Park Conservancy was founded in 
1980, and it soon began to hire its own staff once the Parks Department 
allowed the unionized municipal workforce to diminish in the park.77 As 
it did so, the Conservancy expanded the scope of its work, its branding, 
and its fundraising, so that by the time it got a contract to manage Central 
Park on its own in 1998, it effectively had been running the park for ten 
years, and had a workforce as large as the City’s workforce in the park. 
By 2008, just ten years later, it would pay for seventy-five percent of the 
park’s operations and employ nearly ninety percent of its workforce.78 
Around the same time that the Central Park Conservancy was 
founded, two other early conservancies were founded: Prospect Park Al-
liance and Bryant Park Restoration Corporation.79 
Davis hired Tupper Thomas, a liberal planner with experience in af-
fordable housing, as the Administrator for Prospect Park.80 Like Barlow, 
Thomas was brought onto the city payroll but also expected to launch a 
nonprofit that would support the park.81 In 1980 Brooklyn, Prospect Park 
 
 74 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 138; see also TED SMALLEY & ADAM STEPAN, 
COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF INT’L AFFAIRS CASE CONSORTIUM, Public-Private Partnerships for 
Green Space in NYC 3 (2014), https://perma.cc/G9ZA-D9NE (“[F]inance mogul George So-
ros and investor Richard Gilder co-founded the Central Park Community Fund, which com-
missioned chemist-turned-urban administrator and Columbia University management Profes-
sor E.S. Savas to study the park and make recommendations.”). 
 75 See generally EMANUEL S. SAVAS & JOHN BENSON, A STUDY OF CENTRAL PARK 44-46 
(1976). This language curiously echoed the British workhouse of the 19th century. The Poor 
Law of 1834 formed “unions”—administrative districts—for the governance of poverty relief, 
mainly done “indoors” through the work-house. The unions were overseen by “Boards of 
Guardians.” Timothy Besley et al., Understanding the Workhouse Test: Information and Poor 
Relief in Nineteenth-Century England 4, 11 (Econ. Growth Ctr., Yale Univ., Working Paper 
No. 701, 1993). 
 76 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 138-39. 
 77 Id. at 131-32, 136-47 (describing the formation of conservancies). 
 78 Id. at 143-44, 155-56 (detailing the personnel shifts from 1980-2008 and the budgetary 
arrangements with the City). 
 79 Id. at 131-32. 
 80 Id. at 136-37. 
 81 Id. at 144-45 (stating that this would become the Prospect Park Alliance). 
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did not have neighbors with the wealth that Central Park’s neighbors had 
at the time; so Thomas could rely less on philanthropy and on having her 
own staff, and more on city workers, involving local civic organizations, 
and creating extensive volunteer programs.82 
If Central Park Conservancy represented a philanthropic model for 
conservancies, and the Prospect Park Alliance a civic model, the third 
early conservancy, the Bryant Park Corporation, represented a more cor-
porate model. Located next to the main branch of the New York Public 
Library in midtown Manhattan near Times Square, Bryant Park was de-
cried as a “public urinal” by Mayor Koch in the late 1970s.83 Under Koch, 
the City had no money to fix up the park nor to begin redeveloping the 
porn-theater-, prostitution-, and drug-dominated economy of Forty-Sec-
ond Street. Instead, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, a philanthropy of the 
Rockefeller family, which owned a great deal of west-Midtown property, 
agreed to provide funds to renovate the main branch of the public library 
abutting the park as long as the park itself was rehabilitated.84 To protect 
its investments in both the library and the neighborhood as a whole, the 
Fund required the City to create and initially fund an organization, then 
called the Bryant Park Restoration Corporation (BPRC), to redevelop and 
manage the park.85 The Koch administration accepted the terms of the 
Fund, and soon, the BPRC closed the park for three years while it under-
went a total renovation (and through which it could close the park to drug 
dealers and users), then reopened the park in such a way as to promote its 
 
 82 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 144-45. See generally BETSY BRADLEY ET AL., 
N.Y.C. LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION: UPPER WEST SIDE/CENTRAL PARK WEST 
HISTORIC DISTRICT DESIGNATION REPORT VOLUME I (Marjorie Pearson & Elisa Urbanelli eds., 
1990) (stating that the promises of increased property values made to the New Yorkers by the 
State in its efforts to get approval for the construction of Central Park in the 1850s had been 
realized). 
 83 The main branch of the Public Library is now, tellingly, named the Schwarzman Build-
ing, after the CEO of the private equity “vulture” fund, Blackstone, which has made a mint in 
property speculation and evictions--a kind of post-crisis enclosure of what otherwise could 
have returned to the commons. David J. Madden, Revisiting the End of Public Space: Assem-
bling the Public in an Urban Park, 9 CITY & COMMUNITY 187, 193-95 (2010). 
 84 Gayle Berens, Bryant Park, New York City, in URBAN PARKS AND OPEN SPACE 46 
(Washington DC: Urban Land Institute et al., 1998) (“[I]n the late seventies, when the Rock-
efeller Brothers Fund began to consider contributing money to renovate the library, the fund 
concluded that the library renovations should proceed only if the park’s problems and derelict 
condition were dealt with.”); see also ROBERT FITCH, THE ASSASSINATION OF NEW YORK 152-
55 (1993) (detailing the role of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in financing and influencing 
redevelopment of some New York City areas like 42nd Street). 
 85 See Terry Benoit, Bryant Park Before BPC, MIDCITY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/637A-PDM4. 
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use in both the daytime and evening. It also allowed permanent conces-
sions, including two full restaurants on the east side of the park and an 
increasing number of food kiosks and even an outdoor bar on the west 
side. It funds its operations largely through these concessions, as it was 
able, from the start, to keep the full amount of concession money in the 
park.86 
All three models have had a significant impact on the form of later 
conservancies.87 But in the late 1980s, frustrated that only Central Park 
Conservancy had the private staff and recreational activities, Henry Stern, 
the parks commissioner during Mayor Koch’s third term, formed the City 
Parks Foundation to raise money for activities in other parks.88 Several 
years later, when parks commissioner again under Mayor Giuliani, Stern 
spearheaded the formation of Partnerships for Parks, a public-private part-
nership between the Parks Department and the City Parks Foundation—
itself set up by the public Parks Department—to organize volunteers in 
parks across the city and to encourage them to form “Friends of” groups 
to raise funds and coordinate volunteer activities in their local parks. 
Some of these groups would be encouraged to become conservancies 
themselves, and the city has hundreds of arrangements, some formal and 
contractual and others not, with “Friends of” groups and conservancies. 
They have no uniformity and, on some level, conservancies are as flexible 
an organizational form as CLTs.89 
Seen from the standpoint of Ostrom’s design principles for govern-
ing the commons, however, conservancies and “Friends of” groups’ dis-
tinctions from CLTs emerge. The obvious difference in dealing with land 
as parks and as housing means that fewer people are excluded from en-
joying the goods in or of parks. To the extent that a specific person’s en-
joyment of a park is curtailed, it is usually due to cultural differences from 
other users or by the high price of amenities offered there as concessions. 
But there are other differences, as well. The units appropriating 
goods are not as well defined in parks because parks are generators of 
private real-estate value, commercial income, and jobs. Perhaps ironi-
cally, this is because the corporate and philanthropic models of conserv-
ancies are best positioned to set rules of appropriation defined by the local 
ability to replenish the goods. “Friends of” groups and civic conservan-
cies, on the other hand, which rely far more on partnering with municipal 
 
 86 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 142. 
 87 See generally Honan, supra note 26 (describing the Brooklyn Bridge Park and Hudson 
River Park as progeny of the Central Park Conservancy, Bryan Park Conservancy, and Pro-
spect Park Alliance). 
 88 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 159. 
 89 See id. at 159-61. 
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workers, are much more at the mercy of larger budgeting processes that 
may not take their parks into consideration. It is also the case that there is 
nothing in any of the conservancy models that necessitates participation 
in governance—or even representation of different interests—on a board 
of directors.90 Even so, the baseline protections offered by the public trust 
doctrine only work if the legislative process is able to adequately repre-
sent the interests of those impacted by the stewardship of parkland under 
conservancy care.91 Needless to say, there are no real mechanisms to en-
sure this representation. 
Even “Friends of” groups may have self-selecting members and di-
rectors and yet, if chosen by the Partnerships for Parks as an official 
group, are under no obligation to expand their representativeness. Ac-
cordingly, too, there may not be internal mechanisms to punish violators 
or air grievances; instead, these tend to get deflected up to the Parks De-
partment, addressed via police or security guard intervention, or simply 
handled by conservancy staff. On the other hand, parks conservancies 
may be seen as nested within a Parks-Department-coordinated govern-
ance system in which conservancies’ “minimal right to organize” (design 
principle 8) affords them specific and defined roles within the system, 
even while bringing some subsidiarity to the operations of the Depart-
ment, i.e. the principle that those closest to the situation should have some 
say in its governance.92 
 
 90 See id. 
 91 See, e.g., Cyane Gresham, Improving Public Trust Protections of Municipal Parkland 
in New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVT’L L.J. 259, 284-86 (2002) (discussing the local community’s 
ability to prevent legislation if legislative approval is required). 
 92 The relationship between parks development and accumulation by dispossession is no-
where clearer than in the legislative enactments that created New York’s High Line, a pri-
vate/public venture and relatively new park that is built atop an abandoned elevated railway. 
The City partially funded the creation of this amenity on the explicit understanding that it 
would lead to uses around the former rail for which property owners would pay more in taxes. 
New zoning encouraged the transfer of air rights from parcels under the line to those on the 
adjacent corridor, allowing high rise luxury development where it had previously prohibited. 
See DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, WEST CHELSEA ZONING PROPOSAL 8 (2005), 
https://perma.cc/JF2J-AJ57. This new permission to build up put pressure on land owners in 
the corridor to sell to investors who could take advantage by building hotels and outrageously 
priced housing. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOL. § 98-33 (2017) (“Transfer of Development 
Rights to the High Line Transfer Corridor.”). Displacing the low-rise tenements and busi-
nesses that stood on the lots in the corridor at the time of the rezoning was part of the park-
creation plan. In other words, as Honan explains, “The Highline . . . has helped to promote 
some of the most rapid gentrification in the City’s recent history. The Highline has been at-
tributed to increasing the property values in the neighborhood by 103 percent.” Honan, supra 
note 28, at 112 (citations omitted). The park itself is operated by the Friends of the High Line, 
a not-for-profit organization that relies heavily on contributions from the real estate concerns 
that own the properties along its edges, the same properties that have their values driven up 
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III. PROBLEMS OF COMMONING BY CLT OR CONSERVANCY 
The historical enclosure of the commons that serves as a departure 
for much of commons scholarship are physical places: pastures in the cen-
ters of English towns and woodlands at the towns’ peripheries that land-
less peasants relied upon as crucial places to grow food for their families, 
to collect firewood, and to graze any livestock that they owned for meat 
and milk.93 The enclosure of those commons was done quite literally, by 
evicting the peasants and fencing their land to divide it and facilitate treat-
ing formerly commonly-accessible sites as private property. In the context 
of the city as commons, enclosure of land is the privatization of resources 
that have been, or should be, publicly accessible. When applied to land-
based resources (homes, parks, gardens, farms), this privatization is en-
closure both literally (fences, eviction) and by analogy (the capture of 
publicly-created value by private actors who can then trade it as a com-
modity).94 
A CLT’s ambition to keep acquiring property in a given area—even 
when largely unfulfilled—is a way to limit the effects of community de-
velopment’s basic contradiction in the wake of the City’s disinvestment 
and abandonment of its property and related services in the 1970s and 
1980s. This contradiction was that, to the extent that groups rooted in low-
income communities could attract government and private funds to reha-
bilitate housing and generally make their neighborhoods better and safer 
 
by proximity to the High Line. Lisa W. Foderaro, Record $20 Million Gift to Help Finish the 
High Line Park, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/KH4P-5EYH . Further evidence 
coupled improvement of the park with the increased monetary value of nearby property: the 
new zoning includes an “improvement bonus” of bulk that would otherwise be prohibited, 
allowing property owners who pay for elevator access, restrooms, small plazas, and structural 
repair and remediation of the High Line open space, or stairs up to the High Line to then build 
larger buildings full of luxury units that can be priced to reflect these nearby amenities. See 
N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOL. §§ 98-25, 98-70, Appendix E (2017) (outlining the “High Line 
Improvement Bonus” and “Special Regulations for Zoning Lots Utilizing the High Line Im-
provement Bonus and Located Partially Within Subareas D, E, G or I”). Even the founders of 
Friends of the High Line recognize that the close coupling of real estate interests and park 
development has not been a boon for low-income neighbors and businesses that pre-existed 
the transformation. See, e.g., Eleanor Gibson, High Line Creators Launch Website to Advise 
on Avoiding Gentrification, DEZEEN (June 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/C5Q9-5WAY (“[Rob-
ert] Hammond, who co-founded the High Line in 1999 with Joshua David, want[ed] to help 
others avoid the gentrification and inequality that occurred in its surrounding Chelsea neigh-
bourhood as a result.”); see also Mirna Nashed, The Gentrification of West Chelsea, 
NYCROPOLIS (May 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/HJ4Z-TNC4. 
 93 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 510 (Progress Publishers, 
Samuel Moore et al. trans., 1890) (1867); see also E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE 
ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 198 (Vintage Books) (1964). 
 94 See Foster & Iaione, supra note 1, at 324-25. 
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for their residents, they risked demonstrating to investors that the area was 
again safe for investment. This put the neighborhood—and all of their 
efforts—at risk of gentrification and displacement and allowed new in-
vestors to enclose the value of the improvements they made. 
In fact, CLTs remove land from the speculative market to preserve 
the value of whatever public investment initially goes into its acquisition 
and improvement and to prevent others from appropriating it.95 Thus, a 
CLT translates initial government subsidies into something comparable 
to a long-term CPR. But, a CLT can only succeed in doing so only to the 
extent that it can expand the governance of neighboring land as a CPR 
and enforce clear rules about withdrawal and membership to an ever-
growing geographic area. 
The requirement of expansion, in turn, puts CLTs in a difficult posi-
tion because it requires the City to change the course of its land policies 
in broader ways. As Harry DeRienzo, a longtime housing advocate and 
developer observed then, by 1994 nonprofit housing organizations had 
begun to “manage the crisis” for the City but were not well positioned to 
push the city to expand low-income housing more generally.96 Indeed, as 
the City under Mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg reoriented its housing pol-
icy toward for-profit developers, the nonprofit housing developers and 
low-income cooperatives found themselves to have been a historically 
transitional organizational mediation of the neoliberalizing state. 
Further, CLTs may be compelled to agree to commodification of 
neighborhood resources in order to secure some land to common. The 
Cooper Square Committee, for example, agreed to let the City sell a large 
lot in the neighborhood, instead of transferring it as an additional devel-
opment site to the CLT and MHA, as a way of capitalizing the already-
built housing to which the CLT and MHA were taking title from the City 
so that it could be used as housing for very low income residents.97 These 
buildings were in need of expensive repairs—due to their disinvestment 
and neglect by the City itself—and the sale brought in funds that the City 
earmarked to enable the repairs to happen.98 
Finally, CLTs have to figure out several other problems of common-
ing. For example, before they have land, to whom must they be account-
able? Who are the users, in Ostrom’s terms, if acquisition of actual land 
that can actually be used is still in the organization’s future? Or who can 
 
 95 See, e.g., JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT’L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: 
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RESALE RESTRICTED, OWNER -OCCUPIED HOUSING 7-8 (2006), 
https://perma.cc/M6YV-ZR9X. 
 96 See Harold DeRienzo, Managing the Crisis, CITY LIMITS, Dec. 1994, at 25. 
 97 See, e.g., Oser, supra note 42, at R5. 
 98 See id. 
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be a member of the CLT, with control of the corporation’s governance, in 
nonprofit law terms?99 Or, how does the CLT think about the tradeoff 
between paying decent construction wages and the affordability of the 
housing it stewards? 
Conservancies, by contrast, never take ownership of the land; they 
manage it, often through an exclusive contract with the City.100 This, 
combined with their not having to have any mechanism of accountability 
to parks users beyond the quality of the service they provide,101 has 
pushed at least the corporate and philanthropic conservancies toward an 
embrace of independence. Interestingly, such independence means some-
thing quite different for parks conservancies and CLTs. Instead of inde-
pendence for conservancies, meaning that the direct users of the CPR gain 
greater control over the resource (as it does for a CLT), independence can 
lead to the abandonment of the conservancy’s role as a steward of the 
public trust. Even though the City, as the land’s owner, is still the ultimate 
policy-setter, conservancy independence provides cover to the City’s 
practices that limit even the public’s recreational enjoyment of land, as 
well as uniform and equitable access to the other valuable goods which 
parks provide. The providers of the funds that enable the renewal of parks 
after the long period of disinvestment, whether philanthropists or real-
estate owners who pay into a business improvement district (as is the case 
for Bryant Park) become the de facto stewards of the public trust, but do 
so in ways that clearly increase their power over the public. Their re-
sources give them outsized power to determine the uses of, and labor prac-
tices in, public park land through funding and participation in conservan-
cies. If one abandons all hope of a functioning democracy as a means of 
distributing the assets of the city as commons, such a management para-
digm starts to appear quite attractive.102 While the New York City of 2019 
is a distorted democracy, leaning in this and other ways toward plutoc-
racy, representative government does still operate here. 
 
 99 See NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 2019). 
 100 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 147-48 (stating this distinction is important, too, 
to the defenders of conservancies, as it mitigates critics’ claims that public goods have been 
privatized). 
 101 Id. at 178-84. Even here, the City would be unlikely to take over management of a park 
from a contracted conservancy even when maintenance lags in quality, in part because the 
City would need staff to manage it. 
 102 See, e.g., Michael Murray, Private Management of Public Spaces: Nonprofit Organi-
zations and Urban Parks, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 199 (2010) (NPOs assume sole phys-
ical responsibility for the public space, becoming ultimately answerable for the success or 
failure of its management . . . . “This clear line of responsibility contrasts strongly with the 
diffuse accountability within governmental organizations”). 
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To get a sense of the way in which this distortion has played out, we 
can look at a proposal made in 2013 by then-State Senator Daniel Squad-
ron. Squadron drafted a bill that would require well-financed conservan-
cies to share 20 percent of their revenue to be placed in a common pool 
to help other parks with less capacity to raise funds.103 Large conservan-
cies opposed the bill vociferously.104 They argued, variously, that the 
amount of sharing required would have real operational consequences for 
the rich conservancies, but could not be spread around in such a way that 
they would have commensurate operational benefits for the poorer ones, 
and that the bill would erect a significant barrier for any conservancy’s 
fundraising efforts and staffing.105 Former Parks Commissioner Adrian 
Benepe spoke against the proposal before Mayor de Blasio took office: 
If we said to the Brooklyn Museum, “You know you’ve done a 
great job fund-raising, but you know, we’re gonna take 10 or 20 
percent of your money and reallocate it to the Queens Museum, 
because they haven’t done quite as good of a job of fund-raising,” 
or “Jennifer Raab has done an extraordinary job raising money for 
Hunter College, and you know what, let’s take some of that $40 
million she brought in this year and reallocate to the Bronx Com-
munity College because they need the money more . . . ” That’s 
not the way democracy works. They’re both public institutions. 
One raises money, the other doesn’t as much.106 
Further, while CLTs may balk at their lessees’ hiring union or pre-
vailing-wage labor rate—as cost of a project done with fairly paid labor 
can push against the goal of deep affordability—in principle and some-
times in fact, they can embrace paying higher wages for construction in 
recognition of its importance in other ways, to the project of commoning. 
Corporate and philanthropic conservancies, however, have actively re-
sisted organizing among their workers, to dodge real accountability to 
 
 103 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 183. 
 104 Id. at 183-84. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 186. On the other hand, he allowed that, “if you become dependent on that reve-
nue, then you start to exploit the parks as much as you can for that revenue. I think the risk is 
that if a lot of our budget is dependent on how much revenue we bring in, that will start to turn 
the parks into a cash cow. We have a little bit of that now. We have some parks where revenue 
stays in the parks. As a long-term model it’s hard to say. Is it a good model or a bad model? I 
suppose that depends on who’s in charge, who’s running things, and how much oversight there 
is.” Id. at 245; see Dan Rosenblum, Is the Revenue-Generating Park a Good Thing? Commis-
sioner Benepe Says It “Depends on Who’s in Charge,” POLITICO (Aug. 11, 2011, 5:28 PM), 
https://perma.cc/UFD3-DFF9. 
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their labor force.107 In fact, one of the Central Park Conservancy manage-
ment’s stories about why the Conservancy hired its own staff was that 
union workers refused to do work outside of their union job descriptions 
without further compensation when the fish in a large pond in the park 
died suddenly en masse and needed to be removed.108 Similarly, Elizabeth 
Barlow Rogers, Central Park Conservancy’s founding president, spoke of 
calling the conservancy’s first non-managerial staff “interns” in order to 
skirt union objections.109 
By way of partial contrast, civic conservancies such as the Prospect 
Park Alliance and many of the “Friends of” groups that it had a significant 
role in training, are more embedded in the complex systems of the Parks 
Department and rely more on public workers.110 Even so, they rely heav-
ily on volunteers, whose work itself both accrues to the value of the sur-
rounding land and buildings, which goes up with increased park mainte-
nance and constitutes, in some ways, a use of the park resource, as well. 
As feminist sociologists have noted in other contexts, like several other 
forms of “free labor,” volunteer work creates value that others may par-
tially appropriate, but achieves this by calling work something other than 
work: civic engagement, giving back to the community, etc.111 This is 
further complicated by the fact that, in Prospect Park, city workers might 
work under the supervision of Prospect Park Alliance staff.112 Thus, 
clearly classifying the constituencies with interest in the park as a CPR 
gets more difficult. 
Yet, at the same time, civic conservancies and “Friends of” groups 
are more likely to connect with other local, civil society organizations. 
Tupper Thomas, who went from being Prospect Park’s City Administra-
tor to the founding president of the Prospect Park Alliance, hired an an-
thropologist to help the group identify the organizations in the communi-
ties surrounding the park and inviting them to serve on a policy-making 
“community committee,” which still meets twenty years after it was or-
ganized.113 Thomas’s emphasis on organizing for community support of 
Prospect Park became a model for the Partnerships for Parks’ efforts to 
organize more “Friends of” groups and conservancies around the city. 
 
 107 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 143-44, 150-51. 
 108 Id. at 144. 
 109 Id. at 143. 
 110 Id. at 145-46. 
 111 See generally id. at ch. 7 (contrasting four types of free labor, including volunteers, 
workfare and JTP workers, and out-of-title work to demonstrate how the Parks Department 
and nonprofits use this vocabulary to manage and justify their use of free labor). 
 112 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 146. 
 113 Id. at 145-46, 270 n.11. 
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Nevertheless, it is still important that not even the civic conservancies nor 
the “Friends of” groups treat the parks as part of a larger city or commu-
nity beyond parks, wherein, for example, the value added to surrounding 
real estate could be pooled and shared according to rules that are collec-
tively devised by the various interests in the CPR.114 At the same time, 
these proposals are all limited to funding parks, not to ensuring, for ex-
ample, that neighboring residents and businesses can share enough of the 
increase in value so as to be able to continue to enjoy the parks equita-
bly.115 
Of course, “philanthropic,” “corporate” and “civic” are rough types; 
no conservancy completely embodies one or the other. But the typology 
is useful in drawing out differences both among the conservancies and 
their “commoning” or “anti-commoning” approaches to parks steward-
ship, and between them and nascent NYC CLTs’ approaches and prob-
lems in commoning. The table below summarizes some of the ways in 
which the problems of governance of the commons characterizes CLTs 
and the three types of conservancy. Understanding the types allows us to 
forecast possible futures for the CLTs that we are working with and ob-
serving: we can see clearly from the path that conservancies have fol-
lowed that who is at the table at the start, who creates the menu and what 
motivations animate the endeavor go a great distance in determining how 
well the entity formed will do as a steward of the commons. We can at 
least attempt to use this history as a guide to the possible futures of CLTs.  
 
 114 There have been several ideas close to this floated in the last decade. See, e.g., NEW 
YORKERS FOR PARKS, SUPPORTING OUR PARKS: A GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE REVENUE 
STRATEGIES 1-2, 14 (2010), https://perma.cc/KTH8-R8LE (suggesting the possibility of fund-
ing parks with a tax on the incremental benefit to property owners who live close to parks). 
This is also fairly close to “Parks Improvement Districts” based on the Business Improvement 
District or BID model. Id. at 14. Battery Park works through this model to some degree. Id. 
 115 Id. at 6, 14, 23. 
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IV. DIVERGENT PATHS, CONTESTED FUTURES 
In New York City, parks conservancies and CLTs, divergent as they 
are, share roots in city-dwellers’ response to the fiscal and social collapse 
of the city in the mid-1970s, when job-loss, federal disinvestment, and 
local land-use policy combined to push the City to near-bankruptcy. The 
late Robert Fitch argued that a significant cause of New York City’s in-
dustrial decline in the 1960s was due to machinations by the Rockefeller 
family, whose early 20th-century speculative bets on real estate would 
otherwise have gone bad.116 With David, one Rockefeller brother as the 
chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, and Nelson, another brother, in the 
Governor’s mansion in Albany, these socially liberal Republicans over-
saw the decimation of New York City’s thriving port (they had long ad-
vocated moving port functions to Newark and Elizabeth, New Jersey) and 
with it, its diverse and small-scale manufacturing base.117 As the Rocke-
fellers and other real-estate owners pushed out manufacturing uses in or-
der to make way for more lucrative commercial and residential space—
their deep pockets allowing them to do so with long-term strategies—the 
City’s loss of more than half a million jobs between 1965 and 1975 also 
meant that its population was shrinking, its tax base was shrinking, and 
its increasingly poor population needed more public services.118 This, and 
the combination of the Oil Crisis in 1973 and President Nixon’s “new 
federalism,” pushed the City to spend well beyond its means and into its 
epochal fiscal crisis. Under the new, banker-led neoliberal regime in 
Washington, New York became more dependent on owners of real estate 
as its diversified tax-base collapsed into a finance, insurance, and real-
estate (so-called “FIRE” sector) monoculture.119 
The range of efforts that we describe above emerged out of this con-
text. Until recently, the language of the “commons” and “commoning” 
was, well, uncommon to describe land stewardship projects led by regular 
citizens and by local state-civil society hybrid efforts. CLTs and other 
nonprofit housing models served the dual task of helping to rehabilitate 
some of the housing that had been decimated by neglect and ensuring that 
 
 116 See generally FITCH, supra note 84. 
 117 Id.; see also JOSHUA B. FREEMAN, WORKING-CLASS NEW YORK: LIFE AND LABOR SINCE 
1945 11 (2000) (calling New York City’s early postwar economy a “non-Fordist city in the 
age of Ford” and considering New York City had a flexible manufacturing base characterized 
by significant innovation and small firm size, in contrast to the massive factories of the Rust 
Belt). 
 118 WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN FISCAL 
CRISIS 43-45, 75-80 (1982). 
 119 See generally PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 4. See also generally KIM MOODY, FROM 
WELFARE STATE TO REAL ESTATE: REGIME CHANGE IN NEW YORK CITY, 1974 TO THE PRESENT 
(2007). 
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the new or existing low-income tenants would not be able to reap a private 
windfall from the application of public funds toward their housing. Here, 
there is some recognition of what was lost and then rehabilitated as some 
kind of common pool resource that needs sustaining and renewal into the 
future. CLTs, of all the organizational forms applied in this arena, make 
this most explicit. 
Similarly, conservancies and “Friends of” parks groups also recog-
nize the need for the ongoing renewal and sustenance of recreational 
spaces that had similarly been decimated by neglect—and, in the case of 
community gardens, often generated by this neglect as buildings were 
torn down after falling victim to arson or structural abandonment. All of 
these groups, in their diverse ways, seek to manage publicly owned re-
sources in ways that ensure their openness to a wide range of users, even 
if this means closing off the spaces, selectively, from time to time, or giv-
ing some space to vendors whose prices are hardly in line with a “general” 
public’s ability to pay to enjoy all the park’s amenities. 
The conservancies’ compromises, however, differ in several im-
portant ways from those of CLTs, such as Cooper Square’s, noted above. 
First, many conservancies have not been formed in a context of neglect, 
but in the context of a newly privatizing and corporate-oriented local 
state. It is not that the City cannot pay for park maintenance and improve-
ment, but rather that successive administrations have found that park 
stewardship can be farmed out to civil society, on one hand, and that the 
residual public staff can be largely supplanted with contingent and pre-
carious workers, on the other. Second, and closely related, the City has 
found that many Manhattan and Brooklyn parks can be maintained with 
significant funds generated in their local areas from businesses and pri-
vate citizens. Aside from the enormous gifts that it sometimes receives, 
such as the $100 million gift from private-equity mogul John Paulson in 
2012,120 the Central Park Conservancy has over 40,000 donors, many 
making small donations.121 Neighbors of conservancy-run parks who own 
property reap private rewards through the premiums—running into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars in aggregate—on their real estate values 
(while renters get pushed further away from such parks because they get 
 
 120 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 140; Lisa W. Foderaro, A $100 Million Thank-
You for a Lifetime’s Central Park Memories, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2012), https://perma.cc/
ATQ5-JXYC. 
 121 KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 140; see also Jason Sheftell, Central Park: The 
World’s Greatest Real Estate Engine, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 3, 2010), https://perma.cc/
9D6G-X6K8. 
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priced out of the area).122 The City, in turn, reaps tax benefits both from 
the commercial activity prompted by parks and from the significant in-
crement in raised real-estate values. Indeed, as New Yorkers For Parks, a 
parks advocacy organization, argued, “smart parks investment pays its 
way.”123 Third, and most obviously, civil-society-based parks steward-
ship rarely contains specific provisions for the commoning of land outside 
of the parks, and indeed partly relies on the intensified commodification 
of this land.124 
By ignoring the impact that management of the open space has out-
side its physical edge, and treating parks only as “the commons”—to the 
extent that they do—conservancies’ commoning projects hypostatize the 
boundaries of the park in ways that work against larger projects of urban 
commoning in the wake of neoliberal enclosure. In so doing, they threaten 
to deepen the dynamic of enclosure itself. 
The compromises facing both conservancies and CLTs suggest that 
the language of commoning is much as Marx describes religious suffer-
ing: it is, he wrote, “an expression of real suffering and a protest against 
real suffering.”125 Commoning strategies are, similarly, both an expres-
sion of contemporary neoliberalizing urban life and a protest against it. 
But the form and content of the protest matters lest it become a simple 
amplification of the conditions themselves. 
We conclude by noting that, in the Partnerships for Parks, the City 
created a public-private partnership with a private entity that it set up it-
self. It did so in order to put resources behind community organizing and 
education around what could be described as commoning strategies for 
local “Friends of” groups, but that can also be described as an indirect 
way of promoting private accumulation as a way of paying for a once-
publicly managed resource. By contrast, the City has supported the for-
mation of a CLT “learning exchange”—with far less money and none for 
 
 122 The former administrator of Prospect Park, Tupper Thomas, suggested that the com-
munities of color that used to be prevalent on the park’s east side have largely been pushed 
further east, and laments that people in poor communities—with some reason—suspect that 
parks improvements are part of a plan to gentrify their neighborhoods and displace them. See 
KRINSKY & SIMONET, supra note 4, at 257. 
 123 See generally NEW YORKERS FOR PARKS, ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
NEW YORK CITY PARKS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES (2002), https://perma.cc/ZJW3-GXHN (re-
searching the secondary economic impacts of investment in parks and finding that strategic 
capital investment results in positive economic gains for neighborhoods, investors, and the 
City). 
 124 See generally id. 
 125 JOHN VAN DER HOEVEN, KARL MARX: THE ROOTS OF HIS THOUGHT 35 (1976) (altera-
tions in original) (quoting KARL MARX, CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1844), reprinted in KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS (T.B Bottomore & 
Maximilien Rubel eds., T.B Bottomore trans., 1963)). 
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organizers—only through money generated through a legal settlement be-
tween an investment bank and the State Attorney General’s office. In 
many respects, the imbalance between government support for the two 
efforts is unsurprising; governments rely on private accumulation, and lo-
cal governments rely specifically on real estate taxes, and CLTs push 
against each by both removing land from the tax rolls and trying to de-
press local land values through expanded presence in areas otherwise ripe 
for speculation and reinvestment. On the other hand, governments also 
have to legitimize their policies and to respond to pressure from the gov-
erned. We have not yet abandoned the promise or the reality of a demo-
cratic urbanity. 
By pushing the commoning efforts of CLTs—and also devising 
ways to re-common conservancies—advocates for an urban commons can 
better show where the battle lines are drawn, who is included among those 
with a say over common pool resources, where the accountability lies, 
and how the resources themselves are embedded in the complex organi-
zations of the state. 
